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Abstract 
Using weekly data for defect rates (proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a Chinese 
textile firm during a 12 months (April 2003 - March 2004) period, we provide some of the first 
rigorous evidence on the presence and nature of peer effects in the manufacturing workplace. 
First, a worker is found to put in more effort and improve her performance when she is working 
with more able teammates. Second, by exploiting the well-documented fact that an exogenously-
formed strong divide between urban resident workers and rural migrant workers exists in firms in 
Chinese cities, we provide novel evidence on the interplay between social networks (urban 
resident group and rural migrant group) and peer effects. Specifically, we find that a worker puts 
in more effort when she is working with more able outgroup teammates but not when working 
with more able ingroup teammates, pointing to intergroup competition as a powerful source of 
the peer effects. Such peer effects across the social network, combined with the presence of 
incentive to outperform teammates at this firm, are largely consistent with recent experimental 
evidence on the important role that group identities play in facilitating altruistic behaviors. 
(Keywords: peer effects in the workplace; social networks; intergroup competition. JEL codes: 
M5, J24, L2) 
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Peer Effects, Social Networks and Intergroup Competition in the Workplace 
 
I. Introduction 
Peer effects are present in the workplace when individual behaviors are influenced by the 
teammates' behaviors or characteristics. For example, a machine operator in a light 
manufacturing plant works harder when his/her teammates are working harder, or when he/she is 
working with more able teammates, even if he/she is solely responsible for his/her own output.  
Interest in such peer effects among economists has been rising considerably. Naturally 
detecting peer effects in the workplace has been of great importance and interest for a growing 
field of behavioral economics and optimal incentive designs. Furthermore, peer monitoring, 
knowledge sharing and hence productivity spillovers among team members in the workplace 
play a central role in the theory of “high performance work system” or “high involvement work 
system” (Appelbaum, et. al., 2000; Gant, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2002; Boning, Ichniowski and 
Shaw, 2007). In addition, peer effects play an important role in economics of organization (e.g., 
Aoki, 1986; Kandel and Lazear, 1992), growth theory (e.g., Lucas, 1988), and FDI (e.g., Fosfuri, 
et. al., 2001).   
However, direct evidence on peer effects in the workplace is relatively scarce, for such 
evidence requires researchers to go deep inside the black-box of the firm and obtain rare access 
to “insider” data on performance of individual workers. Pioneering works using internal 
personnel data in economic research include Medoff and Abraham (1980), and Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom (1994a, 1994b). More recently, a number of studies (e.g., Lazear, 2000, Kleiner and 
Helper, 2003, Fernie and Metcalf, 1999, Paarsh and Shearer, 1999, Knez and Simester, 2001, 
Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2005, and Shi, 2007), use such “insider” data and study the 
effects on individual worker performance of a change in pay methods (e.g., the switch from time   2
rates to piece rates or to performance pay). A related line of work examines the effects on 
individual worker performance of the shift to team-based production (e.g. Batt, 1999, Hamilton, 
Nickerson and Owan, 2002, and Jones and Kato, 2007). None of these studies examine peer 
effects and performance spillovers.  
New econometric case studies on the subject are emerging, however. Mas and Moretti 
(2009) use individual productivity data on supermarket cashiers at a large supermarket chain in 
California and provide direct evidence on performance spillovers though peer pressure. Bandiera, 
Barankay and Rasul (2009) use individual productivity data on fruit pickers at a leading U.K. 
agriculture firm and show that workers tend to conform to their friend’s productivity level. 
Finally, Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) exploit random groupings of professional golfers 
and test the presence of peer effects in professional golf tournaments. Unlike the first two studies, 
they find no evidence for peer effects.
1   
In this paper we use individual performance data on weavers at a large textile firm in 
China and provide rigorous evidence on peer effects. Perhaps most importantly our study takes 
advantage of the well-documented social divide between urban resident workers and rural 
migrant workers in China’s transition economy and examines the potentially important interplay 
between peer effects and such exogenously-formed and clearly-defined social networks (rural 
migrant network vs. urban resident network). The potentially important role of social networks in 
worker’s decision making has been reported in the literature (e.g., Duflo and Saez, 2004 who 
find that female workers’ retirement investment decisions are correlated with the other female 
workers’ decisions in the same department, but not the male workers’). Recent experimental 
evidence also points to the important role that group identities play in overcoming self-interests 
                                                        
1 Falk and Ichino (2006) provide experimental evidence on peer effects whereas Rees, Zax and Herries 
(2003) present early empirical evidence on productivity spillovers, using revenue data.   3
and fostering altruistic behaviors (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009). Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) 
also find that under a relative performance scheme, a high-ability worker would lower his/her 
performance in order to boost the pay for his/her friends.  
In contrast to Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009), we find stronger peer effects across 
the social network rather than within the network, i.e., a worker is found to put in more effort 
when she is working with more able outgroup teammates but not when working with more able 
ingroup teammates. Based on our own field research at the firm and our reading of the literature 
on group identity and its effects on behaviors, we interpret the finding as follows. Consider the 
arrival of a more able worker to the team. An average incumbent worker in the team is found to 
put in more effort and improve her performance in response to the arrival of the new high-ability 
worker to her team when the newcomer is an outgroup worker (belonging to the other social 
network) but not when the newcomer is an ingroup worker. The arrival of the high-ability 
outgroup worker is viewed as a threat to the supremacy of her own group over the other group 
(or to the group’s plan to establish its supremacy over the other group). Such intergroup 
competition pressure prompts the worker to put in more effort to maintain the supremacy of her 
group over the other group (or carry out the group’s plan to establish its supremacy without 
delay). The pervasiveness of “us against them” mentality generates powerful intergroup 
competition in the workplace which generates the cross-network peer effect. The weak peer 
effect within the network also suggests that knowledge sharing and contagious enthusiasm/role 
model may be relatively less powerful drivers of the peer effect.  
Finally, we will argue that such peer effects across the social network, combined with the 
presence of incentive to outperform teammates at this firm, are largely consistent with recent 
experimental evidence on the important role that group identities play in facilitating altruistic   4
behaviors (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009). 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the data and the empirical 
setting. Section III illustrates the econometric strategies and presents our peer effect estimates. 
Section IV presents the results on the interplay between peer effects and social networks. Section 
V concludes. 
 
II. Data and Setting 
The Chinese textile firm in our case study, SCT, is based in Shijiazhuang, an industrial 
city and the capital of Hebei province in the northeastern China. Textile is one of the city's most 
prosperous industries. SCT was founded in 1921, originally as a state-owned enterprise (SOE). 
However, like many other large SOEs, SCT suffered from the financial crisis during the 1990's 
due to outdated facilities, an aging workforce, and shrinking market. In 1998 the firm was one of 
the first large-scale SOEs to be privatized. The ownership and management restructure saved the 
firm from the threat of bankruptcy. SCT employed about 3,500 workers during our study period. 
In collaboration with Xiao-Yuan Dong and Derek C. Jones, we collected several kinds of 
data from the case.
2 These were collected during a lengthy study period, highlighted by two 
separate site visits with extensive interviews with the Director of Human Resources, the Director 
of the Weaving Division, a line supervisor and two team leaders at the Weaving Division, and the 
Director of Data Management (who was in charge of all internal data). In addition, to get 
perspective from an outsider, the site visit was supplemented by an extensive interview with a 
long-term consultant for SCT who has been observing the firm for many years. As well as 
collecting various performance and personnel data, we also deepened our knowledge of the case 
by collecting data from a survey that we designed and administered to all team leaders. 
                                                        
2 See Dong, Jones and Kato, 2007 for details on the data.     5
The detailed personnel data with which SCT generously provided us include personal 
characteristics, weekly performance measures and wage for all of its weavers in the weaving 
division over the 53-week span between March 2003 and April 2004. An advantage of this 
"insider" dataset is that the individual performance measures are recorded by machines and thus 
measured with little errors. For the purpose of this study, we dropped 12 weavers who have 
worked for only 1 week as well as 115 observations where the weaver worked for less than 2 
days of the week, for we have too little data to accurately predict abilities for these weavers. 
They are also unlikely to receive or cause any peer effects with such short presence in the team. 
The resulting dataset has 9966 observations for 287 individual weavers.
3 Table 1 provides the 
summary statistics of their personal characteristics. All but 9 weavers are female. They all have 
graduated from junior high school but not high school. About 67% of them are rural migrant 
workers, while the rest are urban resident workers. 
 
Production Process and Performance Measures 
A quick glance at the workplace gives observers a first impression that the role of weavers in the 
production process is rather limited since the operation appears to be fully automated and cloths 
are produced by automated looms rather than weavers. However, a longer and closer observation 
of the workplace reveals that automated loom machines are far from perfect and that problems 
do occur from time to time (such as broken threads).
4 Each weaver's main task is to pay close 
attention to her assigned loom machines (multiple loom machines are assigned to each weaver) 
                                                        
3 In addition, one outlier observation was dropped, where its defect rate was above 10% (the 
maximum in the rest of data is 2.5%) and its daily output was only 5 meters (the mean in the rest is around 500 
meters). 
4 Integrating careful field research into standard econometric analyses is a key element of “insider 
econometrics” (Bartel, Ichniowski and Shaw, 2004). For a compelling demonstration of the value of 
conducting careful field research before embarking on quantitative research, see Ichniowski, Shaw and 
Prennushi (1997).      6
and minimize the occurrence of such operational problems; and if problems arise, solve the 
problems quickly and effectively. 
For example, “good weavers” will detect early signs of problems and make timely 
adjustments to the operation process so that problems will not fully materialize and hence no 
defective product will result. Should problems actually turn up, “good weavers” will solve them 
in a timely and effective manner so that defective output will be minimized. Due to the problem 
solving nature of their main task, SCT constantly tells their weavers how important quality is, 
and asks them to work toward "zero defect". 
For each weaver in each week, the firm keeps three performance-related records: total 
output produced, days worked, and defective output produced. From these three variables, we 
calculated the following two performance measures:
5 
Defect Rate (quality measure):  
(1) DefRatet = {(Defective Outputt)/(Total Outputt)}×100; 
Average Daily Nondefective Output (quantity measure):  
(2) DayOutt = {(Total Outputt - Defective Outputt)/(Days Workedt×10)}. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the performance measures. The mean of days worked is 
6.3 days (a day is counted as an 8-hour work period, so it's possible for the maximal days worked 
to exceed 7). The mean of DayOut is around 545 meters with standard deviation of roughly 180 
meters. The mean of defect rate is approximately 0.24% with standard deviation of 0.18%. 
Although "zero defect" is emphasized in the workplace, there doesn't exist a week where zero 
defect rate is actually achieved. 
                                                        
5  The variables are scaled so that the regression coefficients are more readable: daily output is 
measured in 10 meters and defect rate is out of 100.   7
The nature of weaving technology and the problem-solving nature of a weaver’s job at 
SCT as described above suggests that the key individual performance variable for weavers at 
SCT is DefRate (quality), and while their discretionary efforts matter significantly for DefRate, 
there appears to be little room for discretion in terms of pace of production (or DayOut). All 
weavers are required to fulfill planned output levels and they appear to do so on most occasions.
6  
In other words, on the one hand, DayOut is largely determined by the plan, and there will 
be very little if any room for weavers to have behavioral response to peer effects. Our wage 
regressions reported later also confirm that there is no monetary incentive to produce more than 
planned. Furthermore, it is difficult if not impossible to identify any peer effects when the output 
of the whole team is influenced by some aggregate demand shocks.  
On the other hand, the weavers have considerable discretion and monetary incentive to 
minimize defective output, and hence behavioral responses to peer effects in the quality measure 
are clearly plausible. Therefore, our investigation of peer effects will focus on defect rate as our 
key performance measure although we will pay appropriate attention to the quantity of output.  
It is still possible, however, that aggregate demand shocks could affect actual defect rate. 
Using the planned performance measures as a control for demand, reassuringly our regressions 
show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the actual defect rate and 
demand shocks. These results will be discussed in more details in the next section. 
 
Team environment 
  SCT uses a standard three-shift operation and each shift has six teams based on the 
                                                        
6 Based on demand for its output, at the beginning of each week, SCT comes up with the upcoming 
week’s detailed production plan with specific numbers for planned output, days worked, and defective output 
assigned to each individual weaver. The correlation between the planned and actual daily output is 0.9562 
whereas the correlation between the planned and actual defect rate is only 0.0957.   8
location of the weaving rooms. Thus, there are a total number of eighteen teams. As shown in 
Table 1, the average team size is around 10.5 with a standard deviation of 2.5. The weavers do 
not switch teams, but the composition of each team changes from week to week due to employee 
turnover and temporary absence. Our field research indicates that the firm does not use any 
systematic rule (explicit or implicit) on team assignment of new workers (such as assigning more 
able workers to teams which face more demanding assignments.) We will also confirm the 
suggested lack of systematic team assignment rules econometrically by testing the random team 
assignment hypothesis with the quantitative data below. 
Assuming that changes in team composition are not correlated with the error terms, we 
have an exogenous source of variation that can be used to test whether a weaver puts in more 
effort and improves her performance when she is working with more able peers. While working 
alongside her teammates, the weaver is responsible for her own output. There is no team 
production at the weaving section of SCT, and no externality is generated by the production 
technology. Moreover, on-the-job interactions among weavers are extremely limited by the 
working environment, because 1) each weaver is required to pay undivided attention to her 
machines and 2) the machines are loud and the weavers are wearing masks. Thus, any peer 
effects could only come from either offline interactions or the simple presence of the teammates, 
or both. 
SCT requires each of the 12 teams to hold team meetings during the meal break, once or 
twice a month to discuss issues concerning quality and exchange each other's experience of 
dealing with problems arising from production. Each team is also encouraged to hold "voluntary" 
team meetings after work as well. According to our own survey of all team leaders, nearly all 
teams meet once a week (four times a month). The average team meeting lasts about an hour. In   9
addition, each team is required to hold a training session and skill contest after work at least once 
a week. The purpose of such sessions is to help each other enhance skill level. Finally, each team 
selects a model worker during one of their team meetings. The company provides select model 
workers with bonuses and paid vacations. For example, during 2002 just before our data 
collection began, about 40 model workers were selected and awarded with a trip to Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand, staying at 3-star hotels. Through various team activities described above, 
each weaver becomes clearly aware of her performance relative to her teammates.   
 
Social Networks 
In the context of an urban Chinese enterprise, there is a powerful social divide between 
urban resident workers and rural migrant workers. The relaxation of the regulations on rural-
urban migration in 1988 encouraged many rural workers to look for a job in the urban areas and 
get paid higher than what they earn from doing agricultural work at home. However, it is not 
easy for rural migrant workers to gain an urban housing registration ("hu kou"), which serves as 
a considerable entry barrier to the buoyant urban labor market for rural migrants, and causes 
inequality between the rural and urban labor force. Without urban housing registration, rural 
workers are ineligible for many high-paying urban jobs as well as the urban welfare programs 
such as healthcare and schooling (Huang, 2001). A rural worker must also pay for a temporary 
residence permit in order to find a legal residence in the urban areas. There is significant 
adjustment cost for a rural migrant to work in the urban area, which does not incur for an urban 
worker. The sharp distinction between the urban and rural status tends to create powerful group 
identities among rural migrant workers as well as among urban workers.  
Our informant (HR director) confirms that social interactions happen differently for the   10
rural and urban workers at SCT. The rural workers are mostly young single women from rural 
villages of Hebei Province. All of them live in the company dormitory free of charge (5 or 6 per 
room). After work they return to the same dorm, eat dinner in the same dining hall, and often 
socialize amongst themselves. It is thus highly likely that they create strong bonds among 
themselves, not only because they can relate more easily to each other, but also because they 
spend much more time together than with the urban workers. Since the rural workers form their 
own community, an urban worker will find it easier to be friends with other urban workers than 
breaking into the network of rural workers. Urban workers also prefer to communicate among 




While confirming that weekly wage for weavers are tied to their performance and days 
worked for the week, our informant does not mention that SCT has any explicit relative 
performance pay scheme. Nonetheless, the existence of skill contests and competition for model 
workers point to the presence of incentive for workers to outperform other workers, however 
small the size of the incentive may be. To explore any possible implicit incentive in wage 
payment for a weaver to outperform her teammates, we run a wage regression with two dummy 
variables indicating whether or not the weaver outperforms her teammate’s average performance 
in DefRate and DayOut as additional explanatory variables. As shown in Table 2, the fixed effect 
estimates of the wage equation first confirm our qualitative evidence from field research that 
individual wages are indeed related to individual performance (DefRate and DayOut) as well as 
days worked in a week. Most importantly, however, the estimated coefficient on the   11
outperformance dummy variable in DefRate is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, 
suggesting an implicit pecuniary incentive for a weaver to outperform her teammates in DefRate. 
Although such reward may not be written explicitly in the wage contract, peer effects would 
arise if the weavers are aware of the implicit competition.
7 
 
III. Estimating Peer Effects 
Identification Strategy 
Consider the production function 
(3)   oit = f(ai, eit, εit) 
where oit is the performance measure of weaver i in week t, ai is her innate, time-invariant ability,  
eit is her effort in week t, and εit is the error term. Weaver i’s performance is determined by her 
innate time-invariant ability, her time-varying effort, and other time-varying random factors. Peer 
effects are present if a weaver's effort is influenced by either the average effort of her teammates 
(how hard her teammates are working) or the average ability of her teammates (how capable her 
teammates are). We call the former "contemporaneous peer effects" and the latter "compositional 
peer effects". The contemporaneous effects are hard to identify due to the paucity of persuasive 
ways to separate εit from eit. Our observed correlation between oit and ō-it (teammates' average 
performance excluding weaver i) could be due to correlation among the noises (for example, due 
to an aggregate demand shock.) Furthermore, regressing ō-it on oit suffers from the "reflection 
problem" (Manski 2003) where the direction of causality cannot be identified. Thus, the 
satisfactory identification of the "contemporaneous effects" requires an instrument that 
influences the coworkers' average performance while not affecting one's own performance. By 
                                                        
7 To be consistent with the findings from our field research, there is no such incentive in DayOut. For 
more information on wage determination at SCT, see Dong, Jones and Kato (2007).    12
definition, however, such an instrument does not exist, for every worker is a coworker of her 
colleagues at the same time.  
The second type of peer effects arises when changes in ā-it (her teammates’ average innate 
ability excluding weaver i) caused by changes in her team composition will bring about changes 
in eit (her own effort level). Such compositional peer effects do not suffer the same econometric 
problems since neither the error term nor the worker's effort at time t should influence the innate 
ability of the coworkers. This is the approach that the recent peer effect literature has taken and is 
also explored in this paper.
8  
There are a number of possible reasons why such compositional peer effects may arise at 
SCT. First, as discussed in Mas and Moretti (2009), when working with more able teammates, a 
weaver may put in more effort to satisfy her competitive spirit. The presence of explicit and 
implicit incentives for weavers to outperform their teammates at SCT (which we described in the 
previous section) amplifies such competitive spirit-induced peer effects. Second, peer effects 
may arise also from contagious enthusiasm and role models. For example, consider the arrival of 
a “superstar” worker. The “superstar” worker may become a role model for her teammates and 
hence inspire them to achieve higher performance. Third, it is certainly possible that peer effects 
stem from knowledge sharing among teammates. For instance, the newly-arrived “superstar” 
worker comes up with a new and better solution to a quality problem. Provided that she shares 
such a new and better solution with her teammates, her teammates will improve their 
performance. 
In addition to those three reasons, Mas and Moretti (2009) consider social pressure as a 
primary source of peer effects. Unlike in the case of supermarket cashiers in Mas and Moretti 
                                                        
8 Starting with Sacerdote (2001) on the peer effects in college, the literature includes previously 
mentioned Mas & Moretti (2009), Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009), and Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo 
(2009).   13
(2009), however, there is no obvious negative externality of underperformance in our case. 
Recall that there is no team production at SCT and that workers do not interact with their 
teammates while operating machines. As such, producing defective output from her assigned 
machines will make her teammates’ work no more difficult. In fact, the presence of explicit and 
implicit pecuniary incentive for a weaver to outperform her teammates points to some positive 
externality of underperformance. As such, social pressure does not appear to be directly relevant 
to the peer effects at SCT. However, once we introduce social networks and group identity, social 
pressure turns out to be relevant in the context of intergroup competition as we elaborate in the 
next section.     
 
Predicting Abilities 
To estimate peer effects successfully using the aforementioned compositional effect 
approach, we need to use a comprehensive set of covariates and predict with precision the true 
innate time-invariant ability of each individual weaver, ai. To this end, we estimate the following 
equation with an extensive list of covariates:  
(4) DefRateit = α + ai + λMit + γ Cjt + βDayOutit + εit 
where Mit is a set of 287 coworker dummy variables controlling for the presence of coworkers. 
For instance, the dummy variable "coworker1" in week t takes a value of 1 if weaver i works 
with weaver 1 in week t in the same team, zero otherwise. Cjt is the set of additional controls 
including week fixed effects and week times team fixed effects. DayOutit is included so that we 
can measure each weaver’s ability to maintain high quality of the output, holding the quantity of 
the output constant. To see if endogeneity of DayOutit is a problem, we used planned DayOut as 
an instrument for actual DayOut. Reassuringly the results changes little in general and Hausman   14
test cannot reject the null that the IV estimate of β is not different from the OLS estimate of β. As 
such, we do not believe endogeneity poses any serious problem.
9   
  We exclude planned DefRate from the right-hand side of Eq. (4), for we are not 
measuring the ability to outperform the plan. If high ability performers also get more demanding 
assignments, then controlling for planned performance would underestimate the spread in ability. 
  As we argued before, DayOut is mostly demand-determined and individual weavers 
appear to have little room for discretionary effort. Hence, predicted innate ability differences in 
DayOut are expected to be of less consequence for our analysis. However, we also estimated a 
similar equation to predict the true innate time-invariant ability of each individual weaver in 
DayOut as well. As expected, all of our results are insensitive to the inclusion of predicted innate 
ability of each individual weaver in DayOut.     
 
Random Assignment 
Before turning to our main task of estimating peer effects, we first need to check whether 
the abilities of the team members at a given time are correlated with each other. If they are, then 
our ability to identify the peer effects will be constrained considerably. Reassuringly our field 
research at SCT points to the absence of any rule (written or unwritten) of assigning the weaver 
to different teams based on her ability. To confirm the absence of such systematic assignment 
rule at SCT, we further test the random assignment hypothesis statistically. Since weavers do not 
switch teams, their predicted abilities also include team fixed effects, for instance as the different 
teams may be producing different textile products. Thus, we cannot identify whether a more able 
                                                        
9 As discussed earlier, we focus on DefRate as the only relevant performance measure for weavers at 
SCT. However, we also considered DayOut as an additional performance measures. As expected, considering 
DayOut as an additional performance measure was found to yield similar results. These as well as all other 
unreported results are available upon request from the authors.     15
worker is assigned to a more able team, as the abilities are measured on different scales across 
the teams. We can, however, test whether a high-ability weaver is working with other high-ability 
teammates at any given time.  
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) point out that the typical estimate of regressing 
the teammates' average ability at time t on one's own ability is biased downward, for one cannot 
be assigned to herself. In other words, the pool of peers that the teammates at time t are drawn 
from have a lower average ability for a high-ability focal worker than for a low-ability worker, as 
the focal worker is excluded from the otherwise identical pool. The bias is more severe when the 
pool is small. Following the bias-correction method in Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009), 
we run the following regression: 
(5) ait= π0 + π1a -i + π2 (a -it - a -i) + team fixed effects + υit 
where ait is the predicted ability in defect rate of person i who shows up at time t, a -it is the 
average ability of the teammates who are actually working with weaver i at time t, and a -i is the 
average ability of all of weaver i’s teammates including those not working at time t (in other 
words, any weaver who works with weaver i at least one time during the time period under 
study). By construction, ai = α N - a -i(N-1) where α  is the average ability of the whole team 
including weaver i and N is the total number of weavers in the team. Thus π1 should be close to 
the mean of -(N-1), which according to Table 1 is about -15. The coefficient π2 indicates whether 
more able workers are matched with other more able teammates at time t, holding the average 
ability of the pool that the teammates are drawn from constant. The null hypothesis of random 
assignment means that π2 is zero. 
Column (1) and (2) in Table 3 present the regression results. As expected, π1 is significant 
at the 1 percent level and close to -15, and more importantly we cannot reject the null that π2=0,   16
supporting our field observation that there is random assignment. The results are robust to the 
inclusion of week fixed effects.  
 
Peer Effect Estimates 
We use the following first-difference model to estimate peer effects: 
(6) ΔDefRateit = θΔa -it + κΔDayOutit + additional controls + Δεit 
where Δ indicates the first difference between week t and t-1. θ measures the compositional peer 
effects. DayOutit is included to control for pace of production and hence possible quantity-
quality tradeoff (in theory a weaver can lower DefRate by simply slowing down her pace of 
production). To make sure that the estimated coefficient on Δa -it is capturing the pure 
compositional peer effect, we include a variety of additional controls. First, we include a set of 
variables controlling for demand, which include: actual days worked, team size (at time t), 
planned defect rate. Planned daily output is excluded in equation because it is highly collinear 
with actual daily output, DayOut. Second, we include constant (to capture a firm-wide time 
trend), individual fixed effects (to capture individual-specific time trends), month fixed effects 
and/or week fixed effects (to capture firm-wide time-specific effects), and month*team fixed 
effects (to capture team-specific time effects). Third, the positive compositional peer effect (θ>0) 
means that when a weaver is working with more able teammates, she will put in more effort and 
improve her performance. However, for the same reason, her teammates also put in more effort 
and improve their performance. In other words, the positive compositional peer effect will likely 
accompany an increase in average effort of her teammates which may cause her effort to rise and 
hence improve her performance through the contemporaneous peer effect. As such, unless we 
control for average effort of her teammates, our estimates will be subject to omitted variable bias.   17
To address this problem, we add Δe -it as an additional control variable where e -it is average 
effort of weaver i’s teammates in week t (the effort level of each teammate, weaver k, is 
calculated by subtracting her estimated ability, ak from her DefRatekt).   
The first difference model is preferred to the fixed-effect level model, for as discussed 
above, we cannot separate the underlying team fixed effects from the individual predicted 
abilities. Thus, in the level model, team fixed effects will show up on both sides of the equation 
causing spurious correlations. 
Table 4 presents the OLS estimates of Eq. (6). The estimates of θ (the effect of the change 
in teammates' average ability in defect rate on the change in the focal weaver's defect rate) are 
positive and mostly significant (t=1.40, 2.13, and 2.29), pointing to the presence of peer effects 
at SCT. The size of the estimated peer effect appears to be plausible. When the average innate 
ability of her teammates in defect rate improves by 0.1 percentage point (or a 0.1 percentage 
point decrease in defect rate) as a result of team compositional changes, the weaver’s own defect 
rate will fall by 0.03 percentage points, ceteris paribus.  
Finally, as expected, we find no evidence for the quality-quantity tradeoff (weavers 
reducing defect rate by simply slowing down the production pace). The estimated coefficients on 
DayOut are small and in fact negative rather than positive.  
 
IV. Peer Effects and Social Networks 
As discussed earlier, we believe there are four possible sources of the peer effects at SCT: 
(i) competitive spirit; (ii) contagious enthusiasm/role model; (iii) knowledge sharing; and (iv) 
social pressure. We now explore how the presence of strong social networks (rural vs. urban) at 
SCT may be interacting with those probable drivers of the observed peer effect.    18
The possible interplay between social networks and contagious enthusiasm/role model is 
rather intuitive and straightforward. The peer effect through contagious enthusiasm/role model is 
more likely to arise within the social network rather than across the social network. Again 
consider the arrival of the “superstar” worker to the team. The peer effect through contagious 
enthusiasm/role model arises when an incumbent team member will be inspired by the arrival of 
the “superstar” worker and perhaps even start emulating her as a role model, resulting in better 
performance for herself. When the “superstar” worker is an ingroup worker as opposed to an 
outgroup worker, the incumbent team member is more likely to be inspired by her and try to 
emulate her as a role model.
10  
Likewise, the peer effects stemming from knowledge sharing among teammates are also 
more likely to arise within the social network rather than across the network. First, as explained 
in Section II, there is little pecuniary incentive to share knowledge with teammates (in fact there 
are explicit and implicit incentives for a weaver to outperform her teammates and hence not to 
share knowledge) and as shown in the recent experimental literature on group identify and 
altruistic behavior (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009), group identity facilitates workers to overcome their 
self-interests and engage in knowledge sharing among workers within the social network. 
Second, the cost of knowledge sharing tends to be lower among workers within the same social 
network than across the network (e.g., rural migrant workers are from the same rural region and 
speak the same dialect, and literally eat and sleep in the same dorm). 
In contrast, the peer effects arising from competitive spirits are likely to be stronger 
across the social network as opposed to within the network. As discussed earlier, when a weaver 
finds herself competing with more able weavers in the workplace, she increases her effort and 
                                                        
10 The positive effects on student outcomes of having teachers of the same gender or race as role 
models are reported in the economics of education literature (see, for instance, Rask and Bailey, 2002; Dee, 
2004; Bettinger and Long, 2005 for recent evidence).       19
improve her own performance to satisfy her competitive spirit. We argue that in general her 
competitive spirit will be more acutely awaken when the increase in the average ability of her 
teammates originates in her outgroup teammates (such as the arrival of the “superstar” worker 
who belongs to the other social network). In addition, the nature of group identity and social 
networks generated by the powerful divide between rural migrant and urban workers in Chinese 
factories makes the aforementioned competitive spirit story particularly relevant and compelling 
at SCT.   
As discussed earlier, the deep rural/urban social divide causes weavers to form powerful 
group identity and a pervasive mentality of “us against them”, resulting in informal yet vigorous 
intergroup competition within the team. In this context of intergroup competition, the arrival of 
new and able weaver from the other social network is viewed as a threat to the supremacy of her 
group over the other group (or the group’s plan to establish its supremacy without delay).
11 
Social pressure to respond strongly to such a threat to the status of the social network will be 
evoked. As discussed and supported by evidence in Mas and Moretti (2009), such social pressure 
prompts a weaver competing with more able outgroup teammates to exert herself more to satisfy 
her group’s collective competitive spirit. The failure to do so may result in shame, reputational 
loss, and social sanctions.  
In contrast, when the increase in the average ability of her teammates comes from the 
rising average ability of ingroup teammates (e.g., the arrival of the “superstar” worker who 
belongs to her own social network), the aforementioned social pressure and collective 
competitive spirit are largely irrelevant.      
To explore the interplay between peer effects and social networks, we modify Eq. (6) to 
                                                        
11 The relationship between inter-group competition and intra-group cooperation has been studied in 
experimental economics (see, for instance, Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel, 2002, Tan and Bolle, 2007, and 
Reuben and Tyran, 2009).   20
allow for the interaction between peer effects and social networks: 
(7) ΔDefRateijt = θ1Δa -ijt + θ2Δa -i-jt + κΔDayOutit + additional controls + Δεit 
where j denotes person i's social network, a -ijt is the average ability of the teammates who are in 
the same network as weaver i, and Δa -i-jt is the average ability of the teammates who are in the 
other network. We use the same set of control variables as in Eq.(6) except that we control for the 
size of the rural and urban networks in the team separately (instead of controlling for the total 
team size). We run the regression separately for the rural migrant workers and urban workers. 
Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the rural and urban workers respectively.  
For the rural migrant worker, as shown in Table 5, the estimated coefficients on the 
average ability of her outgroup teammates (or urban teammates) are positive and significant at 
the 5 percent level in columns (1) and (2) without controlling for team-specific time effects and 
still significant at the 10 percent level even when additionally controlling for team-specific time 
effects. In contrast, the estimated coefficients on the average ability of her ingroup teammates 
(rural) are not significant and relatively small (especially when team-specific time effects are 
controlled for). In short, for the average rural migrant worker, changes in the average ability of 
her ingroup (rural) teammates are found to have little impact on her own effort, whereas she is 
found to put in more effort and improve her performance in output quality when the average 
ability of her outgroup (urban) teammates increases. The magnitude of such intergroup peer 
effects appears to be again sensible. For instance, as her outgroup (urban) teammates’ average 
ability in defect rate improves by 0.1 percentage point (or a 0.1 percentage point drop in defect 
rate), the average rural migrant weaver will put in more effort and improve her own defect rate 
by 0.02 percentage points.  
The results for urban weavers are similar to those for rural weavers although they are   21
slightly less significant. The estimated coefficients on the average ability of the urban worker’s 
outgroup teammates (rural) are positive and significant at the 10 percent level with team-specific 
time effects controlled for and close to significant without team-specific time effects (t=1.59 and 
1.60). The estimated coefficients on the average ability of her ingroup teammates (urban) are, 
however, much smaller and not at all significant. As such, similar to the case of rural workers, on 
the one hand, an urban weaver is found to change her effort level very little in response to a 
change in her ingroup (urban) teammates’ average ability. On the other hand, she is found to put 
in more effort and lower her own defect rate by 0.03 to 0.04 percentage points when her 
outgroup (rural) teammates’ average ability rises by 0.1 percentage point.    
In sum, we find that the peer effects arise amongst weavers across the social network 
rather than within the network. It follows that the peer effects at SCT are likely to be driven by 
each weaver’s competitive spirit in general and her collective competitive spirit in the presence 
of intergroup competition, combined with social pressure (shame, social sanctions and 
reputational damages), in particular. In contrast, the lack of significant peer effects within the 
network suggests that contagious enthusiasm/role model and knowledge sharing may be of less 
relevant at SCT.   
The regression results in Tables 5 and 6 also suggest that our peer effect estimates are 
unlikely to be driven by common noise, for otherwise θ1and θ2 should both be significant for 
both groups of workers. For instance, suppose an increase in the average ability of the urban 
team members is accompanied by some positive shocks to everyone's productivity. If that is the 
case, we should expect θ1 to be as large, positive and significant as θ2 for urban workers, which 
we do not observe. 
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V. Conclusions 
Using weekly data for defect rates (proportion of defective output) for all weavers in a 
Chinese textile firm during a 12 months (April 2003-March 2004) period, this paper has 
provided some of the first rigorous evidence on the presence and nature of peer effects in the 
manufacturing workplace. First, we have found that a worker increases her effort level and 
improves her performance when working with more able teammates. Second, by exploiting the 
well-documented fact that an exogenously-formed deep divide between urban workers and rural 
migrant workers exists in firms in Chinese cities, we have provided novel evidence on the 
interplay between social networks (urban resident group and rural migrant group) and the peer 
effects. Specifically, workers have been found to put in more effort when working with more 
able outgroup teammates but not when working with more able ingroup teammates.  
 Our finding of the significant peer effects across the social network yet not within the 
social network sheds light on the actual mechanisms though which the peer effects arise. As in 
the case of U.S. supermarket cashiers studied by Mas and Moretti (2009), the peer effects we 
detected for Chinese weavers are driven probably neither by knowledge sharing nor by 
contagious enthusiasm/role model, for if knowledge sharing and contagious enthusiasm/role 
model were key drivers of the peer effect, we should have found more significant peer effects 
within the social network rather than across the social network. However, unlike Mas and 
Moretti (2009)’s cashiers, our weavers do not impose any direct negative externality on their 
teammates by underperforming. In fact, there are explicit and implicit incentives for them to 
outperform their teammates (or positive externality imposed on their teammates by 
underperforming). Hence social pressure (e.g., shame, reputational damage and social sanctions) 
to minimize negative externality imposed on her teammates by her own underperformance   23
(which turned out to be the primary source of the peer effects among cashiers in Mas and Moretti, 
2009) is of less relevance to our weavers.  
Instead we believe that strong group identity and intergroup competition have much to do 
with the peer effect that we have observed. In the context of the pervasive divide between rural 
migrant workers and urban resident workers in the manufacturing workplace in Chinese cities, 
each weaver’s competitive spirit is more powerfully awaken when the increase in the average 
ability of her teammates stems from the rising ability of her outgroup teammates as opposed to 
her ingroup teammates. The increase in the average ability of the worker’s outgroup teammates 
is regarded as a threat to her group’s relative standing against the other group. Hence there is 
social pressure for her (and all other ingroup teammates) to counter such a rise in the average 
ability of her outgroup teammates by putting in more effort and improving her performance.  
Such competitive behavior is further amplified by the presence of explicit and implicit 
pecuniary incentive for each weaver to outperform her teammates. The rising average ability of 
the worker’s ingroup teammates may stimulate her individual competitive spirit (which is also 
consistent with the presence of the aforementioned relative performance incentive) yet such 
individual competitive spirit appears to pale compared to collective competitive spirit (or 
collective social pressure on each teammate to counter the rise in the average ability of her 
outgroup teammates).    
A recent study of fruit pickers in the U.K. (Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul, 2009) reports 
stronger peer effects within the network than across the network. Group identity of their fruit 
pickers appears to be largely personal and certainly not based on deep-rooted social and 
historical institutions (such as rural migrant versus urban resident workers in our case), it is quite 
possible that intergroup competition (“us versus them” mentality) which prevails between rural   24
migrant and urban resident workers in the workplace in Chinese factories may not be as 
pervasive among those fruit pickers. Such lack of powerful intergroup competition among fruit 
pickers may account for their contrasting finding.    
Economists have been increasingly aware of the potentially important behavioral effects 
of group identities (see for example Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and lately rigorous evidence on 
such behavioral effects of group identities has been provided by economists. Most of the 
evidence is experimental and evidence from the actual workplace is still rare. For instance, Chen 
and Li (2009) report intriguing experimental evidence on the significant role of group identities 
in overcoming self-interests and facilitating altruistic behaviors. Our weavers display similar 
group identity-induced altruistic behaviors when competing with their teammates in the presence 
of pecuniary incentives to outperform their teammates. Specifically, when competing with more 
able teammates, the weaver is less likely to win skill contest and model worker competition, and 
hence prizes, and her wage will be more likely to be lower since she is less likely to outperform 
the average performance of her teammates (as shown in our wage regression results). As such, 
there is an incentive for her to respond to the rising ability of her teammates by putting in more 
effort and enhance her performance. However, she will not act on this incentive insofar as the 
source of the rising average ability of her teammates is the presence of more able ingroup 
teammates. In other words, a weaver appears to be willing to let her teammates win the prize and 
earn higher wages insofar as they belong to the group with which she strongly identifies. Such 
altruistic behaviors do not arise if the rising average ability of her teammates comes from more 
able outgroup teammates. As such, our finding on the interplay between peer effects and social 
networks represents one of the first field evidence from the actual workplace on the role of group 
identities in altruistic behaviors.        25
Lastly, our finding of stronger peer effects across the network than within the network 
implies that peer effects are stronger in the integrated workplace than in the segregated 
workplace, and that inter-network competition in the integrated workplace may lead to better 
overall performance in the integrated workplace than in the segregated workplace.
12  
                                                        
12 Charness and Villeval (2009), based on new experimental evidence, draws a similar implication for 
the advantage of workplace diversity in the context of mixing senior with junior workers. In addition, Kurtulus 
(2009) uses subjective evaluations of individual workers as performance measures and provide evidence for 
the performance-enhancing effect of workplace diversity in terms of gender, narrowly-defined tenure within 
division, education and wage.          26
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DefRate (out of 100)  0.239 0.181 9966
DayOut (in 10m)  54.555 18.285 9966
Days Worked in a Week  6.271 0.88 9966
Wage 148.136 30.369 9966
Ability in DefRate (out of 100)  0.009 0.278 287
Ability in DayOut (in 10 meters)  1.299 26.369 287
Female Dummy  0.969 0.175 287
Rural Dummy  0.666 0.473 287
Size of a Team in Week t  10.458 2.481 953
Size of an Entire Team  15.944 1.305 18 
Table 2 Relationship between performance measures and incentive: Dep=Wage 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
DefRate -9.946***  -9.247***  -10.260***  -9.466*** 
 (3.54)  (3.50)  (3.65)  (3.57) 
DayOut 0.079***  0.078***  0.086***  0.083*** 
 (3.29)  (3.39)  (3.44)  (3.46) 
Days worked in a week  24.816***  24.632*** 24.912***  24.770***
 (49.73)  (47.74)  (48.94)  (47.18) 
Teammates' Avg DefRate  -5.235  5.382*  -8.855*  3.163 
 (1.19)  (1.81)  (1.78)  (0.97) 
Teammates' Avg DayOut  -0.025  -0.001  0.006  0.037 
 (0.58)  (0.03)  (0.12)  (1.23) 
Outperforming Teammates' Avg DefRate  6.768***  6.446***  6.776***  6.461*** 
 (10.79)  (11.23)  (10.86)  (11.30) 
Outperforming Teammates' Avg DayOut  0.402  0.424  0.335  0.400 
 (0.63)  (0.68)  (0.52)  (0.63) 
Actual - Planned DayOut  -0.104**  -0.099*  -0.070  -0.080 
 (2.04)  (1.94)  (1.27)  (1.48) 
Team Size  -0.148  -0.079  -0.139  -0.124 
 (0.73)  (0.66)  (0.50)  (0.79) 
Time FE  Month  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared 0.734  0.751  0.733  0.750 
N 9961  9961  9961  9961 
Absolute values of t in parentheses         
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level.     
All models include individual fixed effects.         
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05     *** p<0.01   
  
Table 3 Random Assignment within a Team: Dep=Ability in DefRate 
 (1)  (2) 
Teammates' Avg Ability in DefRate (entire team)  -14.796***  -14.792*** 
 (48.94)  (48.74) 
Teammates' Avg Ability in DefRate (in week t) -     
Teammates' Avg Ability in DefRate (entire team)  0.003  -0.005 
 (0.32)  (0.54) 
Week FE   No  Yes 
Team FE   Yes  Yes 
Adj.R-squared 0.998  0.998 
N 9961  9961 
Absolute values of t in parentheses     
All standard errors are corrected for heteroskedascity and clustered at the team level. 
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01" 
  
Table 4 Peer Effects: Dep=First Diff. in DefRate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Teammates' Avg Ability (FD DefRate)  0.270  0.333**  0.323** 
 (1.40)  (2.13)  (2.29) 
DayOut(FD) -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
 (19.15)  (19.12)  (19.03) 
Time FE  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared 0.122  0.146  0.138 
N 9009  9009  9009 
Absolute values of t in parentheses       
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. 
All models include individual fixed effects, demand controls and 
teammates’ average effort.   
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01" 
  
 Table 5 Peer Effects and Social Networks: Sample=Rural Weavers; Dep=First Diff. in DefRate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Rural Teammates' Avg Ability (FD DefRate)  0.141  0.121  0.055 
 (1.49)  (1.28)  (0.54) 
Urban Teammates' Avg Ability (FD DefRate)  0.189**  0.178**  0.171* 
 (2.24)  (2.07)  (1.80) 
DayOut(FD) -0.004***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
 (15.19)  (15.46)  (15.46) 
Time FE  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared 0.110  0.130  0.118 
N 5511  5511  5511 
Absolute values of t in parentheses       
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. 
All models include individual fixed effects, demand 
controls and teammates’ average effort.       
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01"    
Table 6 Peer Effects and Social Networks: Sample=Urban Weavers: Dep=First Diff. in DefRate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Rural Teammates' Avg Ability (FD DefRate)  0.343  0.345  0.391* 
 (1.59)  (1.60)  (1.71) 
Urban Teammates' Avg Ability (FD DefRate)  0.073  0.165  0.161 
 (0.53)  (1.19)  (1.00) 
DayOut(FD) -0.005***  -0.004***  -0.004*** 
 (11.03)  (10.38)  (9.96) 
Time FE  Month  Week  Week 
Month*Team FE   No  No  Yes 
Adj.R-squared 0.126  0.179  0.155 
N 3312  3312  3312 
Absolute values of t in parentheses       
All standard errors are robust and clustered at the individual level. 
All models include individual fixed effects, 
demand controls and teammates’ average effort.      
* p<0.10   ** p<0.05   *** p<0.01"  
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